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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Beth Irby1 died from strangulation on May 1, 2011, and the State charged her exhusband, Joe Thomas, with first degree murder. While the focus of the trial2 was on the act that
led to Ms. Irby’s death – whether Mr. Thomas strangled Ms. Irby, or whether Ms. Irby
accidentally strangled herself while engaging in autoerotic asphyxiation – an equally important
consideration for the jury, if they found that Mr. Thomas committed the act, was what was his
mental state when doing so?
Mr. Thomas asserts that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter, as a reasonable view of the evidence supported
giving the instructions, and the instructions were a correct statement of the law. Furthermore,
although the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a failure to instruct on a lesser included offense
is generally harmless error, Mr. Thomas asserts that under the specific facts of this case, the State
will be unable to meet its burden of proving the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alternatively, Mr. Thomas asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A little after 1:00 a.m. on May 1, 2011, Guy Arnzen called 911 and said Joe Thomas just
told him that he killed his ex-wife, Beth Irby, by strangling her, and that Mr. Thomas was on his

1

Ms. Irby is sometimes referred to as Beth Irby-Thomas in the Clerk’s Record and transcripts,
but will be referred to as Ms. Irby in this Brief.
2
This appeal stems from Mr. Thomas’ conviction upon retrial after the Idaho Supreme Court
vacated his original conviction in 2015. See State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916 (2015).
1

way back to Ms. Irby’s house to get their children.3 (Tr., p.410, L.22 – p.420, L.10; Ex. 1.) The
dispatcher asked Mr. Arnzen if Mr. Thomas gave him any indication of why he killed his exwife, and Mr. Arnzen answered, “he said he ‘couldn’t take it anymore,’ I don’t know.” (Ex. 1.)
Officers responded to Ms. Irby’s house where they found Mr. Thomas outside, walking
away from his vehicle with hands raised, and he was immediately arrested. (Tr. p.485, L.23 –
p.487, L.4; p.529, L.6 – p.530, L.21.) Ms. Irby was found unconscious under some blankets in
the living room, with a belt wrapped tightly around her neck. (Tr., p.428, L.4 – p.434, L.24.)
Efforts to revive Ms. Irby were unsuccessful and the cause of her death was determined to be
strangulation. (Tr., p.435, L.3 – p.438, L.5; p.487, L.19 – p.489, L.23; p.866, Ls.19-24; p.890,
Ls.1-8; p.1234, L.15 – p.1241, L.12.)
The State filed an Information charging Mr. Thomas with first degree murder, by
premeditation. (R. 37796, p.189.)4 The basic dispute at the first trial was whether Ms. Irby’s
death was caused by Mr. Thomas strangling her with his belt, as the State claimed, or whether
Ms. Irby died as a result of a tragic accident, using a belt around her neck while masturbating,
losing consciousness, and ultimately dying, as Mr. Thomas asserted. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho
916 (2015). “Prior to trial, the State became aware that [Mr. Thomas] may offer evidence that
[Ms. Irby] engaged in erotic asphyxiation … and filed a motion to exclude evidence regarding
[Ms. Irby]'s prior sexual acts or behavior, contending that it was not relevant.” Id. at 917. The
district court ultimately ruled that Mr. Thomas could testify about his own sexual acts with

3

The couple had two children, three-year-old Joseph, and two-year-old Joshua, at the time of
Ms. Irby’s death. (Tr., p.704, L.19 – p.705, L.3.)
4
The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s
Transcripts from Mr. Thomas’ first appeal, docket number 39776-2012, into the record in this
appeal. See Corrected Order Augmenting Appeal, filed August 29, 2018. Citations to those
documents will include the original five-digit case number, 39776.
2

Ms. Irby, including using a belt to strangle her while having sex with her immediately prior to
her death, but excluded evidence that Ms. Irby had engaged in such activities with others in the
past. Id. at 918.
The jury found Mr. Thomas guilty of first degree murder by premeditation, the district
court sentenced him to a unified term of life, with 25 years fixed, and he appealed. (R. 39776,
pp.1246, 1304-06, 1321-24.)

The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately vacated Mr. Thomas’

conviction, finding the district court erred in excluding evidence that Ms. Irby had engaged in
erotic asphyxiation with others prior to her death. Thomas, 157 Idaho at 919-20.
Just as in the first trial, the main focus of the parties during the retrial was whether the
evidence proved that Mr. Thomas was responsible for Ms. Irby’s death, or whether it was all a
tragic accident, but there was little evidence presented about Mr. Thomas’ purported mental
state. In its opening argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the evidence the State planned to
present would show that Mr. Thomas and Ms. Irby “had a volatile relationship,” and that
Mr. Thomas “ended it by strangling [Ms. Irby] to death with his own belt.” (Tr., p.382, Ls.7-12.)
The State highlighted Mr. Thomas’ purported statement to Mr. Arnzen – that he strangled his exwife “because I just couldn’t take that shit anymore.” (Tr., p.378, L.16 – p.379, L.6.)
While Mr. Thomas and Ms. Irby were no longer as close as they once were after their
divorce, the jury heard evidence that they got along fairly well for the sake of their children.
Ms. Irby’s mother, Jeanene Hickman-Church, testified that Mr. Thomas and Ms. Irby’s postdivorce relationship was sometimes “fine and other times it was fairly contentious,” but that their
focus was on their boys, whom they both loved. (Tr., p.702, L.14 – p.703, L.24; 705, L.15 –
p.706, L.8; p.721, L.24 – p.722, L.11.) Alex Church, Ms. Irby’s step-father, testified that
Mr. Thomas and Ms. Irby “worked together to meet the needs of the boys.” (Tr., p.397, L.9 –

3

p.398, L.18; p.407, Ls.2-8.) In fact, the week prior to Ms. Irby’s death, Mr. Thomas, Ms. Irby
and their sons celebrated Easter Sunday with the Irby family at Ms. Irby’s Aunt’s house.
(Tr., p.1060, L.25 – p.1063, L.9.)5
Mr. Thomas did not testify during the second trial; however, an audio recording of his
prior testimony was played for the jury. (Tr., p.627, L.6 – p.637, L.23; Ct. Ex. 74.)6 His
testimony was summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
[Mr. Thomas] testified that he went to [Ms. Irby]'s house at about 8:30 p.m. on
April 30, 2011, and played with their sons. After the sons were in bed, he and
[Ms. Irby] eventually drank some rum. They then started kissing and hugging and
[Ms. Irby] grabbed his belt. They ultimately engaged in sexual intercourse, and
[Ms. Irby] had put the belt around her neck. He stated that about twenty times
previously she had put the belt around her neck and tightened it when they were
having sex and had also used neckties. He stated that when he got up to dress, she
continued to masturbate with the belt around her neck, which was something she
had done before. He then left and sat in his vehicle for a while attempting to
sleep. After a little while, he went back into [Ms. Irby]'s house and found her
dead.
Thomas, 157 Idaho at 918.
Some of the evidence presented supported Mr. Thomas’ claim. A few hours before
Ms. Irby died, she invited Mr. Thomas over to see the boys before she put them to bed.
(Tr., p.1019, L.8 – p.1023, L.19; Def. Ex. OOO.) The officers who first arrived at Ms. Irby’s
house testified that she was in various stages of undress when they found her. (Tr., p.428, L.4 –
p.430, L.3; p.453, L.7 – p.455 L.5 (Officer Aubertin testifying Ms. Irby was not wearing pants,
had a tank-top covering her buttocks, and he did not recall seeing her breasts); Tr., p.483, L.1 –
p.484, L.8; p.485, Ls.7-16; p.489, Ls.1-2; p.500, L.19 – p.501, L.2 (Officer Thueson testifying
Ms. Irby was mostly nude, with a T-shirt around her arms and her breasts exposed); Tr., p.1065,

5

Easter Sunday was on April 24th in 2011. See https://www.wheniseastersunday.com/year/2011/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
4

Ls.1-25; p.1070, Ls.3-23 (Reserve Officer Hoskins testifying that Ms. Irby was unclothed with a
sheet covering her). Officer Aubertin testified that the belt was “extremely tight” and it took him
“a little bit to get my fingers under it and get the belt broke loose.” (Tr., p.434, Ls.19-24.)
Officer Thueson and Reserve Officer Hoskins opined at the scene that it appeared to be “one of
those sex things.” (Tr., p.508, L.17 – p.509, L.6; p.1072, L.17 – p.1073, L.4.) Additionally, a
vaginal swab taken from Ms. Irby revealed a sperm fraction matching Mr. Thomas’ DNA.
(Tr., p.804, L.12 – p.809, L.19.)
Experts called by both parties agreed that Ms. Irby died of strangulation, and agreed that
the various prescription drugs and alcohol Ms. Irby had in her system would have contributed to
her decision making, but did not kill her. (Tr. p.648, L.21 – p.682, L.3 (Dr. Jennifer Souders,
Clinician in pain management); p.863, L.23 – p.908, L.25 (Dr. John Howard, medical examiner
and forensic pathologist); p.1115, L.10 – p.1182, L.6 (Kenn Meneely, forensic scientist); p.1250,
L.15 – p.1303, L.7 (Dr. Barbara Wolf, medical examiner and forensic pathologist).)
Dr. Howard, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Ms. Irby, testified that
unconsciousness can occur within three seconds of a person being strangled, provided there was
sufficient force to stop blood flow to the brain, and that death can occur within three to five
minutes. (Tr., p.890, L.1 – p.892, L.12.)
Evidence that Ms. Irby liked to be strangled during sex did not solely come from
Mr. Thomas. Ms. Irby’s friends, Carrie Cannon and Laura Schumaker, testified that one night in
October of 2006, Ms. Irby told them that she and Mr. Thomas engaged in erotic asphyxiation,
where Mr. Thomas would use his hands to choke Ms. Irby during sex. (Tr., p.685, L.9 – p.691,

6

Court’s Exhibit 74 is a redacted audio recording of Mr. Thomas’ testimony from the first trial.
(Tr., p.627, L.6 – p.637, L.23.)
5

L.5.) Jed Fischer testified that he dated Ms. Irby for about six months from late 2010 until early
2011, and that on two occasions Ms. Irby moved his hand to her neck and applied pressure to his
hand while they were having sex. (Tr., p.692, L.25 – p.697, L.15.)
The most damning piece of evidence supporting the State’s theory that Mr. Thomas
strangled Ms. Irby, was his purported confession to Guy Arnzen. The jury heard a recording of
Mr. Arnzen’s prior testimony. 7 (Tr. p.426, L.18 – p.427, L.19; Ct. Ex. 70.) Mr. Arnzen testified
that he was a close friend of Mr. Thomas, whom he had met while the two were in law
enforcement together. (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 1: 00:00 – 2:25.)8 Mr. Arnzen testified that in the
evening hours of April 30, 2011, Mr. Thomas came to his house, the two had a few drinks and
chatted about Mr. Thomas’ emerging business and how his kids were doing, and Mr. Thomas ate
some food. (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 1: 2:30 – 4:57; Track 2: 00:00 – 1:45.) Mr. Thomas seemed to be
in a good mood, and he did not make any negative comments about Ms. Irby; in fact, Mr. Arnzen
had never heard Mr. Thomas make any threatening statements directed at Ms. Irby. (Ct. Ex. 70,
Track 2: 27:19 – 27:42.) Mr. Thomas was texting9 while the two were watching TV, and
Mr. Arnzen, who was taking hydrocodone due to his back problems, eventually passed out on the
couch. (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 1:45 – 3:52; 21:30 – 26:40.) Mr. Arnzen woke up around 8:30 or
9:00, saw that Mr. Thomas was gone, and fell back asleep assuming Mr. Thomas would return.
(Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 3:52 – 4:15.)
A few hours later, Mr. Arnzen woke up to Mr. Thomas banging on his door and
windows, he let Mr. Thomas in and started asking him what he was doing, but a deeply troubled

7

Mr. Arnzen passed away in 2014. (Tr., p.420, L.21 – p.421, L.19.) As with Mr. Thomas’ prior
testimony, the jury heard a redacted audio recording of Mr. Arnzen’s prior testimony. (R., p.426,
L.18 – p.427, L.19; Ct. Ex.70.)
8
The times noted herein reflect the run-time of the recordings and are approximate.
6

Mr. Thomas wouldn’t answer him right away. (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 5:12 – 7:40.) According to
Mr. Arnzen, Mr. Thomas then told him that “he killed Beth.” (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 7:40 – 8:16.)
Mr. Arnzen thought Mr. Thomas was “pulling [his] leg” at first, but then Mr. Thomas told him “I
strangled her.” (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 8:17 – 9:25.)
Although Mr. Arnzen did not ask him why he killed his ex-wife, Mr. Arnzen testified that
Mr. Thomas told him that “he just couldn’t take that shit anymore.” (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 11:12
– 11:37.)10 Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Arnzen to wait before calling the police because he wanted to
say goodbye to his boys, who were at Ms. Irby’s house. (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2, 11:45 – 12:20.)
Mr. Arnzen called 911 after Mr. Thomas left his house (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2, 12:40 – 12:50), and
Mr. Thomas was arrested at Ms. Irby’s house a short time later (Tr. p.485, L.23 – p.487, L.4;
p.529, L.6 – p.530, L.21).
Counsel for Mr. Thomas requested the court instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter.11 (Tr., p.1315, Ls.13-19; see also R., pp.3024-25.) Counsel
argued a reasonable view of the evidence—specifically, Guy Arnzen’s testimony that
Mr. Thomas told him, “I killed Beth. She’s strangled. I couldn’t take that shit anymore,”
justified giving the instruction.

(Tr., p.1316, Ls.3-13.)

Mr. Thomas’ counsel argued that

testimony supports a finding that Mr. Thomas lost control of his emotions and strangled Ms. Irby
– “It’s quite similar to some of the leaps that the State is going to be asking the jury to make to
get to premeditation.” (Tr., p.1316, Ls.10-18.) The district court recognized that voluntary

9

Mr. Thomas testified that he and Ms. Irby were texting about him going to see her and the kids
later that night. (Ct. Ex. 74, Track 1: 41:48 – 42:10.)
10
Mr. Thomas testified that he was very emotional when he returned to Mr. Arnzen’s house, he
told him that Ms. Irby had been strangled and was dead, and he did say, “I can’t take this
anymore … there’s too much happening,” but he denied telling Mr. Arnzen that he killed
Ms. Irby. (Ct. Ex. 74, Track 2: 24:09 – 29:12.)
7

manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder; however, without discussing Mr. Thomas’
purported statement to Mr. Arnzen, the court found no reasonable view of the evidence
supported giving the instruction. 12 (Tr., p.1319, L.15 – p.1320, L.2.)
During its closing arguments, the State argued the evidence supporting its premeditation
theory was the up-and-down nature of Mr. Thomas’ relationship with Ms. Irby, that it took three
to five minutes for Ms. Irby to die from belt-caused strangulation, and that Mr. Thomas told
Mr. Arnzen that he couldn’t take it anymore. (Tr., p.1365, L.5 – p.1366, L.20.) Deprived of the
ability to argue in the alternative that the evidence supported a finding that Mr. Thomas acted
upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, counsel for Mr. Thomas focused on the evidence
that supported the theory that Ms. Irby’s death was a terrible accident, arguing that the
premeditated killing of the mother of his children would be completely out of character for
Mr. Thomas. (Tr., p.1367, L.21 – p.1398, L.4.)
The jury began its deliberations at 11:16 a.m. on June 13, 2017. (Tr., p.1402, L.13 –
p.1403, L.1.) Three and one-half hours later, the jury sent the district court a note requesting that
they be allowed to listen to the prior testimony of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Arnzen, in addition to
other audio and video exhibits. (Tr., p.1403, L.19 – p.1405, L.16; Ct. Ex. 80.) The parties and
the district court agreed that it would be inappropriate for the jury to hear Mr. Thomas’ and
Mr. Arnzen’s testimony again, and informed the jury as such. (Tr., p.1405, L.16 – p.1407, L.25;
Ct. Ex. 81.) The jury deliberated for the rest of that afternoon and for the next two and one-half

11

Mr. Thomas did not object to the State’s request for an instruction on the lesser included
offense of murder in the second degree. (Tr., p.1315, Ls.9-13.)
12
Additionally, the district court denied Mr. Thomas’ request for an instructions on involuntary
manslaughter, accident or misfortune, and an instruction declaring that a person does not have a
duty to prevent harm coming to another person. (Tr., p.1315, L.3 – p.1320, L.16; see also
R., pp.1326-28.) Mr. Thomas does not challenge the district court’s rulings on these requested
instructions in this appeal.
8

days, finally returning a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, at around 1:30 p.m. on June 16,
2017. (R., pp.3091, 3140-44.)
During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Thomas’s counsel recommended the district court
impose a sentence of 30 years, with 10 years fixed 13 (Tr., p.1483, Ls.22-25), while the State
recommended that the district court impose a sentence of life, with 30 years fixed (Tr., p.1495,
Ls.3-4). Prior to imposing sentence, the district court observed, “the Court can only surmise that
you were in a rage. That you had lost control. That your anger overcame you.” (Tr., p.1511,
Ls.8-9.) The district court imposed a sentence of life, with 24 years fixed. (R., pp.3273-75;
Tr., p.1514, Ls.15-18.) Mr. Thomas filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.3281-84.)

13

The district court noted that it did not have the authority to impose an indeterminate sentence
of 30 years (Tr., p.1501, L.16 – p.1502, L.17), because a conviction for first degree murder
requires a term of life in prison, with a minimum of 10 years fixed. See I.C. § 18-4004.
9

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Thomas’ request to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter?

II.

In light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, did the district court abuse its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence?

10

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Thomas’ Request To Instruct The Jury On The Lesser
Included Offense Of Voluntary Manslaughter
A.

Introduction
According to Mr. Arnzen’s testimony, Joe Thomas told him that he killed Ms. Irby

because he “just couldn’t take that shit anymore.” If jurors believed that testimony, they could
have found that Mr. Thomas acted upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, and was
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The district court erred by denying Mr. Thomas’ request for
instructions on voluntary manslaughter. Furthermore, while Idaho precedent presumes that the
failure to give an instruction on a lesser included offense is necessarily harmless, the facts of this
case, including the jury instructions actually given, rebut that presumption, and the State will be
unable to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

The District Court Erred By Failing To Instruct The Jury On The Lesser Included
Offense Of Voluntary Manslaughter
Idaho’s appellate courts “exercise[ ] free review over whether a jury was given proper

instructions.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). “A trial court presiding over a
criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of law necessary for the jury's information.”
Id. The court must honor a party’s request for a specific instruction if that instruction is “‘correct
and pertinent.’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-2132). A proposed instruction is correct and pertinent
where: (1) it is a correct statement of the law; (2) it is not adequately covered by other
instructions; and (3) it is supported by the evidence presented. Id. at 710-11 (citing State v.
Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285 (1982)).

11

Similarly, Idaho appellate courts exercise free review of the district court’s refusal to
instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373-74 (2002).
Idaho law provides that the district court “shall” instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if
two requirements are met.

I.C. § 19-2132(b).

First, one of the parties must request the

instruction. I.C. § 19-2132(b)(1). Second, there must exist “a reasonable view of the evidence
presented in the case that would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser
included offenses but did not commit the greater offense.” I.C. § 19-2132(b)(2). “When a
district court is requested to give an instruction on a lesser included offense, it must look to all of
the evidence presented at the trial to determine if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to
support the requested instruction.” State v. Thomasson, 122 Idaho 172, 175 (1992) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
In sum, a district court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if 1) a party
requests such an instruction; 2) the requested instruction is for an actual lesser included offense
of the offense charged; 3) the instruction requested correctly states the law; and 4) a reasonable
view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense,
but not the offense charged. Mr. Thomas met all of these requirements.

1.

Mr. Thomas Requested Instructions On Voluntary Manslaughter

Mr. Thomas requested instructions on the difference between murder and manslaughter,
and on the elements of voluntary manslaughter, both pretrial and during the jury instructions
conference. (Tr., p.1315, Ls.3-19; see also R., pp.3024-25.) Therefore, Mr. Thomas met his
initial burden.
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2.

Voluntary Manslaughter Is A Lesser Included Offense Of Murder

The Idaho Supreme Court recognizes “‘two theories under which a particular offense
may be determined to be a lesser included offense of the charged offense.’” State v. Flegel, 151
Idaho 525, 527 (2011) (quoting State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1997)). Under the statutory
theory, “[a]n offense will be deemed to be a lesser included offense of another, greater offense, if
all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included offense are included
within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the greater offense.” Id (quoting State v.
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114 (1979)). Under the pleading theory, “‘an offense is an included
offense if it is alleged in the information [or indictment] as a means or element of the
commission of the higher offense.’” Id. at 529 (quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211
(1986), in turn quoting State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included
offense of murder. See State v. Porter, 142 Idaho 371, 375 (2005); State v. Grube, 126 Idaho
377, 381 (1994). “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought
… .” I.C. § 18-4001.
Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is
implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
I.C. § 18-4002. “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being … without malice.”
I.C. § 18-4006.

Voluntary manslaughter is committed “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of

passion.” I.C. § 18-4006(1).
Under the statutory theory, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder
because, unlike murder, it is committed without malice. Additionally, voluntary manslaughter is
a lesser included offense under the pleading theory in this case.
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The State alleged, that

Mr. Thomas, “did willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with malice
aforethought kill and murder” Ms. Irby. (R. 39776, p.189.) Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of murder, as charged in the information, because the jury could have found
that Mr. Thomas unlawfully killed Ms. Irby but did so without deliberation, premeditation, and
malice aforethought.

3.

Mr. Thomas’ Proposed Instructions Correctly State The Law

Mr. Thomas proposed two relevant instructions.

First, Mr. Thomas requested an

instruction on the distinction between murder and manslaughter, as stated in Idaho Uniform
Criminal Jury Instruction (I.C.J.I.) 707. (R., p.3024.) The proposed instruction reads as follows:
The distinction between murder and manslaughter is that murder requires
malice aforethought, while manslaughter does not.
There is no malice aforethought if Mr. Thomas acted with adequate
provocation while in the heat of passion or a sudden quarrel, even if Mr. Thomas
intended to kill the deceased. The provocation would have been adequate if it
would have caused a reasonable person, in the same circumstances, to lose selfcontrol and act on impulse and without reflection.
Heat of passion may be provoked by fear, rage, anger, terror, revenge or
other emotion. Adequate provocation does not exist, however, when a person acts
from choice and malice aforethought even though experiencing any number of
emotions.
Mr. Thomas would not be acting in heat of passion or sudden quarrel if
sufficient time elapsed after the provocation for a reasonable person in the same
circumstances to have regained self-control and for reason to have returned.
(R., p.3024.) Mr. Thomas also requested an instruction on the elements the State would need to
prove in order for the jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, as provided for in
I.C.J.I. 708.
In order for Mr. Thomas to be guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, the state
must prove each of the following:
1. On or about the 1st day of May 2011,
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2. in the state of Idaho
3. Mr. Thomas engaged in conduct which caused the death of Beth Irby,
and
4. Mr. Thomas acted unlawfully upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion
and without malice aforethought in causing such death.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find Mr. Thomas not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find Mr. Thomas guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
(R., p.3025.) Mr. Thomas’ proposed instructions are consistent with I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002,
and 18-4006, and provide the jury with further guidance on the distinction between murder and
manslaughter, using language approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. In sum, Mr. Thomas’
proposed instructions correctly describe Idaho’s voluntary manslaughter law.

4.

A Reasonable View Of The Evidence Supports A Finding That Mr. Thomas
Killed Ms. Irby Upon A Sudden Quarrel Or Heat Of Passion, Without Malice
Aforethought

A reasonable view of the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Thomas killed Ms. Irby
upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, but without malice aforethought. Mr. Arnzen
testified Mr. Thomas was in a good mood when he was visiting with him a few hours before
Ms. Irby died, and that he had never heard Mr. Thomas make any threatening statements about
Ms. Irby. (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 27:19 – 27:42.) The text messages between Mr. Thomas and
Ms. Irby that night did not reveal any animosity; rather, Ms. Irby invited Mr. Thomas over to see
their boys before she put them to bed, which is consistent with her mother and step-father’s
testimony that the two tried to put their differences aside for the benefit of their children.
(Tr., p.397, L.9 – p.398, L.18; p.407, Ls.2-8; Tr., p.702, L.14 – p.703, L.24; p.705, L.15 – p.706,
L.8; p.721, L.24 – p.722, L.11; Tr., p.1019, L.8 – p.1023, L.19; Def. Ex. OOO.)
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The jury heard evidence that Ms. Irby enjoyed being strangled while engaging in sexual
activity, and that she and Mr. Thomas had done so on prior occasions. (Tr., p.685, L.9 – p.697,
L.15.) When the officers found her, Ms. Irby was in a state of undress, and a sperm fraction
from Mr. Thomas was found in her vagina. (Tr., p.428, L.4 – p.430, L.3; p.453, L.7 – p.455 L.5;
Tr., p.483, L.1 – p.484, L.8; p.485, Ls.7-16; p.489, Ls.1-2; p.500, L.19 – p.501, L.2; Tr., p.804,
L.12 – p.809, L.19; Tr., p.1065, Ls.1-25; p.1070, Ls.3-23.) Officer Thueson and Reserve Officer
Hoskins remarked at the scene of her death, that Ms. Irby appeared to have died during sexual
activity. (Tr., p.508, L.17 – p.509, L.6; p.1072, L.17 – p.1073, L.4.)
According to Mr. Arnzen, when Mr. Thomas returned to his house, he said he killed
Ms. Irby because “he just couldn’t take that shit anymore.” (Ct. Ex. 70, Track 2: 11:12 – 11:37.)
Mr. Arnzen told the 911 operator Mr. Thomas said he ‘couldn’t take it anymore,’ I don’t know.”
(Ex. 1.) Mr. Thomas testified that he was very emotional when he returned to Mr. Arnzen’s
house and he did in fact say, “I can’t take this anymore … there’s too much happening.” (Ct. Ex.
74, Track 2: 24:09 – 29:12.) The jury could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Thomas and
Ms. Irby had sex, during which Mr. Thomas strangled Ms. Irby for her sexual pleasure as they
had done so many times before, but that at some point, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion,
Mr. Thomas strengthened his grip around the belt, causing Ms. Irby to lose consciousness, and
eventually die. The district court itself opined, albeit during sentencing, that “[t]his is a case of
inability to control a very base emotion that explodes. . . .” (Tr., p.1512, Ls.1-12.)
The State argued to the jury that Mr. Thomas must have acted with premeditation
because he would have had to hold the belt tightly around Ms. Irby’s neck for three to five
minutes before she died. (Tr., p.1366, Ls.6-20.) That argument, however, was not supported by
the evidence presented. While Dr. Howard testified that it would take a person three to five
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minutes to die from strangulation, he also testified that a person could lose consciousness within
three seconds. (Tr., p.890, L.1 – p.892, L.12.) Officer Aubertin testified that the belt was
“extremely tight” and it took him “a little bit to get my fingers under it and get the belt broke
loose.” (Tr., p.434, Ls.19-24.) Considering Mr. Thomas was not in the act of strangling
Ms. Irby when Officer Aubertin found her, the evidence showed that a person would not need to
constantly apply pressure to that particular belt for it to remain tightly wrapped around
Ms. Irby’s neck. In other words, a reasonable view of the evidence showed that whatever
pressure was applied to cause Ms. Irby’s death, did not necessarily need to be applied for the
three to five minutes the State claimed. Because the evidence showed that the belt would not
loosen on its own, the jury could have found, as the district court apparently believed, that
Mr. Thomas had a sudden inability to control his emotions. This loss of control could have
lasted no more than a few seconds but still led to Ms. Irby’s death.
A reasonable view of the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Thomas and Ms. Irby
were engaged in a form of consensual sexual activity where Ms. Irby voluntarily placed herself
at the mercy of Mr. Thomas and, in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, Mr. Thomas lost control
and tightened the belt around Ms. Irby’s neck, resulting in her death. The district court erred in
refusing to give the jury Mr. Thomas’ proposed instructions on the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter.

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That The District
Court’s Erroneous Denial Of Mr. Thomas’ Request To Instruct The Jury On Voluntary
Manslaughter Was Harmless
If an appellate court determines the district court erred either in overruling a defendant’s

objection, or in denying a defendant’s motion, the State bears the burden of proving, “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v.
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Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see
also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). The question “is whether the jury
actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt,
independently of” the inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). “The
inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error.”

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)

(emphasis added).
In State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Court seemingly adopted a brightline exception to this requirement when the error at issue is the failure to instruct the jury on a
lesser included offense. Idaho Code § 19-2132(c) reads,
If a lesser included offense is submitted to the jury for consideration, the court
shall instruct the jury that it may not consider the lesser included offense unless it
has first considered each of the greater offenses within which it is included, and
has concluded in its deliberations that the defendant is not guilty of each of such
greater offenses.
I.C. § 19–2132(c). The Joy Court reasoned that, because I.C. § 19-2132(c) requires a jury to first
acquit a defendant of a greater offense before even considering a lesser included offense, and
because jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions, a finding of guilt on the greater offense
necessarily renders harmless any error in failing to instruct on a lesser included offense.14 Id. at
6-8. The Joy opinion, however, does not compel this Court to automatically find the error in this
case harmless. In Joy, the district court denied the defendant’s request for instructions on lesser
included offenses; therefore, since no such instructions were given, the Court could only theorize
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Ultimately, the Joy Court found the district court erred in admitting evidence of Joy’s prior
conduct, found that error was not harmless, and vacated his convictions on that basis. Joy, 155
Idaho at 8-12.
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that if the district court had instructed the jury on lesser included offenses, it necessarily would
have instructed the jurors that they could not even consider the lesser included charges until after
they acquitted the defendant of the charged offenses. Id. at 7 n.1.
Unlike in Joy, the jury instructions actually given in this case included an “acquittal first”
instruction, that did not require the jury to acquit Mr. Thomas of the greater charge, before the
jury could consider any lesser included offenses. The State requested the district court instruct
the jury on the lesser included offense of second degree murder. (R., pp.2998-99.) The State
specifically requested that the court provide the following transition instruction:
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Murder in the First
Degree, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider
the included offense of Murder in the Second Degree.
(R., p.2998.) This proposed instruction matches the wording of Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction
225, and the district court granted the State’s request, giving jury Instruction No. 17.
(R., p.3084.) Instruction 17 does not bar the jurors from “considering” the lesser included
offense prior to acquitting Mr. Thomas of first degree murder; rather, it simply states that the
jury must consider the second degree murder if they were to acquit Mr. Thomas of first degree
murder.15
While this instruction may not comport with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2132(c), the
jury was in fact given this instruction. Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions that they
are actually given, not the ones they should have been given. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 7. The jury
was not instructed that they may not consider a lesser included offense unless they first acquit
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To the extent that Instruction 17 was an incorrect statement of law, the State invited any error
by requesting the very instruction the court provided. See Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106–
07 (2009) (“‘The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when
his own conduct induces the commission of the error.’”) (quoting State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho
816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993)).
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Mr. Thomas of first degree murder. On the contrary, the jurors were told that each of them were
triers of fact, none of them were required to believe the evidence presented, and that each of
them could re-examine their own views at any time, prior to the jury as whole reaching a verdict.
Specifically, the jurors were instructed that it was their duty “to determine the facts, to apply the
law set forth in [the] instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case,” and that “the
law does not require you to believe all the evidence.” (R., pp.3069-70 (J.I. No. 4).) They were
told that they must follow all of the instructions and they “may not follow some and ignore
others.” (R., p.3076 (J.I. No. 9).) The jurors were again told, “[a]s members of the jury it is your
duty to decide the facts and to apply those facts to the law that I have given you.” (R., p.3077
(J.I. No. 10).) Importantly, the court instructed the jury, “[d]uring your deliberations, you each
have a right to re-examine your own views and change your opinion.” (R., p.3086 (J.I. No.19).)
The court further instructed the jurors that, “[w]hether some of the instructions will apply will
depend upon your determination of the facts.” (R., p.3089 (J.I. No. 21).)
Reading the instructions as a whole, jurors would not have interpreted Instruction 17’s
dictate that they must determine whether Mr. Thomas was guilty of second degree murder if they
acquit Mr. Thomas of first degree murder, as a prohibition against even considering whether the
evidence supports a guilty verdict to second degree murder, unless and until they acquit
Mr. Thomas of first degree murder. On the contrary, the instructions as a whole told the jurors
that there were to determine what crime, if any, Mr. Thomas committed.
Although the acquittal first doctrine as articulated in I.C. § 19-2132(c) arguably runs
afoul of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment,16 the instructions actually given in this
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Mr. Thomas did not challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2132(c) in the district court,
and therefore, does not raise such a challenge in this appeal. Mr. Thomas recognizes that the
Idaho Supreme Court upheld the statute against a constitutional challenge made 25 years ago in
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case are consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s understanding of how juries actually
work. In Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
reviewed a trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple
assault, in a case where the defendant was charged with assault with the intent to commit serious
bodily injury. Id. at 205-06. The Keeble Court first determined that a federal court presiding
over an “Indian” charged with a crime authorized by the Major Crimes Act of 1885, has the
lawful authority to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, even if the lesser offense is not
specifically delineated in the Act. Id. at 209-12. The Court recognized that criminal defendants
may benefit from having a jury instructed on such lesser included offenses, finding
[I]f the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element
of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury
must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is
entitled to a lesser offense instruction—in this context or any other—precisely
because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury’s practice
will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is
likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.
Id. at 212-213. Although the Keeble Court did not hold a defendant has a due process right to
instructions on lesser included offenses, id. at 213, the Supreme Court has found the Constitution
does require instructions on any lesser included offenses in capital cases. See Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 635-36 (1980).
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has explained, “even if we assume that the
instructions required a unanimous vote before the jury could consider a lesser offense,” because

State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758 (1993); however, as has been recognized repeatedly by the
United States Supreme Court, barring a jury from even considering a lesser included charge prior
to acquitting the defendant of the greater charge is simply inconsistent with how people sitting as
jurors actually behave, and arguably how the due process clause expects them to behave. C.f.
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980);
Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012).
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only a verdict triggers double jeopardy protections, nothing prohibits individual jurors from
reconsidering their earlier decisions, provided an actual verdict has not actually been rendered.
Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599, 607-08 (2012); cf. State v. Caramouche, 155 Idaho 831,
837-38 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the judge in a bench trial can reconsider and amend his
initial oral findings prior to actually entering the verdict because, up until that point, the verdict
was not final). In fact, in this case the jurors were informed that they each have a “right to reexamine [their] own views and change [their] opinion.” (R., p.3086 (J.I. No.19).) “The very
object of the jury system, after all, is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by
arguments among the jurors themselves.” Blueford, 566 U.S. at 607 (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, consistently with how the United States Supreme Court recognizes jurors actually
deliberate, the instructions actually given in this case told the jurors they could simultaneously
consider whether the State proved Mr. Thomas committed first degree murder, second degree
murder, or nothing at all. The “acquittal first” instruction actually given in this case was little
more than an instruction that jurors could not find Mr. Thomas guilty of both first and second
degree murder. If the district court had granted Mr. Thomas’ request for instructions on the
difference between murder and manslaughter, and on the elements of voluntary manslaughter, it
is reasonable to assume the court would have also provided a transition instruction similar to
Instruction 17. If the district court had done so, the instructions when read as a whole would
have allowed the jury to simultaneously consider whether the State proved Mr. Thomas
committed first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or nothing at all.
The jury deliberated for over three full work days, showing that at least one juror was
troubled by some aspect of the State’s case. Perhaps the deliberations centered around whether
Mr. Thomas committed the prohibited act, i.e., whether he killed Ms. Irby, or whether Ms. Irby
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died as a result of a tragic accident. However, it also entirely possible that the jurors agreed that
Mr. Thomas strangled Ms. Irby, and the deliberations focused on Mr. Thomas’ mental state. The
jurors were faced with the question of what would make a man who had no history of violence,
who had for the most part put aside his differences with his ex-wife in order to best raise their
children, and who had been in a good mood a short time earlier, suddenly decide to violently
strangle the mother of his children to her death. Mr. Thomas acting upon a sudden quarrel or in
the heat of passion, is a reasonable conclusion jurors could reach.
The State cannot prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that had the jurors been properly
instructed that a person who kills upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, is guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, the jury would nevertheless have found Mr. Thomas killed Ms. Irby
with premeditation. The district court’s error is not harmless.

II.
In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case, The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence
Mr. Thomas asserts that the district court imposed an excessive sentence upon him. This
case is highly unusual. Unlike many cases, the record here demonstrates that this offense was a
tragic anomaly, one that did not merit such a severe sentence. Indeed, Mr. Thomas’ remarkable
background and character called for a strong measure of leniency. The record contains no fewer
than 60 letters and emails attesting to that character. The district court, however, did not
appropriately consider the compelling mitigating information and improperly analyzed how the
goals of sentencing applied in this case.
When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court
will conduct “an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the
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offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.”

State v.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court “considers the entire length of the
sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. Appellate courts conduct a multi-tiered
inquiry when an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. “The sequence of the inquiry is:
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
The third factor is the most important for sentencing purposes, and the one that is absent
in this case. “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is “necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution,” the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive “considering any view of the facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
In this case, multiple and varied mitigating circumstances illustrate that Mr. Thomas’
sentence is excessive and unreasonable under any view of the facts. First, this was Mr. Thomas’
first felony conviction. In fact, his prior record as an adult consisted of only one misdemeanor
conviction for negligent driving that occurred 14 years before he was arrested for this offense.
(PSI, p.122.)17 Other than that, his record consists of one speeding ticket and one citation as a
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Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and its attached documents will use the
designation “PSI,” and will include the page number associated with the 254-page electronic file
containing those documents.
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minor, for possession of alcohol. (PSI, p.122.) As such, Mr. Thomas’ lack of a serious record
alone strongly supported a more lenient sentence. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)
(reducing sentence where conviction was the defendant’s first felony with no prior history of any
similar crimes). Indeed, as the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “The courts have long
recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual
criminal. In addition to considerations of humanity, justice and mercy, the object is to encourage
and foster the rehabilitation of one who has for the first time fallen into error, and whose
character for crime has not become fixed.” State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971).
Second, Mr. Thomas had been a dedicated and compassionate law enforcement officer
who received numerous accolades and often went above and beyond what was required of him to
help people and resolve situations fairly. His employment history plainly shows that this offense
was completely out of character for him, and the district court should have given more weight to
the mitigating nature of that work history. See Nice, 103 Idaho at 90-91 (highlighting the fact
that the defendant was a skilled a mechanic who was employed as a truck driver at the time of
his sentencing, then going on to reduce the defendant’s sentence, in part, because he “was
working and helping to support his children at the time of the conviction”).

Some of

Mr. Thomas’ many certificates and letters of appreciation are attached to the PSI and they clearly
illustrate his dedication to helping others. (PSI, pp.25-49.) Viewed as a whole, they demonstrate
Mr. Thomas’ commitment to his work, to his continuing education and professional
development, and to people in need. (PSI, pp.25-49.)
For example, in March of 2009, two local citizens wrote a letter to the sheriff
commending Mr. Thomas for his performance. That letter read, “We have had a few instances
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that we have had to ask a Deputy from your Sheriff’s office to visit our home. We wanted to let
you know what a fine representative you have in Deputy Joe A. Thomas. Deputy Thomas is
very respectful yet personable. He is a great listener and is very fair.” (PSI, p.42.) The writer
went on to say, “We always feel that he understands our concerns but also that he has an
outstanding understanding of the law and its applications. Our county and your department is
very lucky to have a mindful and enthusiastic officer with the caliber of Deputy Thomas.” (PSI,
p.42.)
Similarly, Mr. Thomas was specifically referenced in a memo commending various
entities involved in a search and rescue operation that took place after a serious car accident in
2009. Chief Deputy Alan Johnson with the Nez Perce County Sheriff’s Office wrote, “Sgt. Jay
Colvin and Cpl. Joe Thomas were crucial in the retrieval” of one of the injured victims “down in
the ravine.” (PSI, pp.37-38.) He went on to say, “It was their dedication and spirit of doing the
right thing which led them to go back down in the ravine a second time in order to locate”
another victim. (PSI, p.38.) “They both knew they would be hiking into a wilderness area,
possibly having to stay the night, due to the approaching darkness and having to hike five to six
miles before being picked up by ground searchers.” (PSI, p.38.) Finally, Deputy Johnson stated
that, without the involvement of Mr. Thomas and the various other entities that participated in
the search and rescue, the two surviving victims “could have died in that ravine.” (PSI, p.38.)
The coordinator of that search also wrote a memo praising Mr. Thomas and the other teams
involved for their performance that day. (PSI, p.39.)
Another letter commended Mr. Thomas for his participation in a staff training event at an
elementary school. The letter stated that Mr. Thomas “did the training on his own time” but
“represented [the sheriff’s office] well.” (PSI, p.43.) The writer also stated that the office was
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“fortunate to have such a compassionate and skilled deputy.” (PSI, p.43.) Another woman
wrote that Mr. Thomas “showed compassion and understanding” in dealing with a difficult
situation and “went above and beyond.” (PSI, p.44.) Notably, she stated that she had been in
law enforcement for 33 years and wrote, “So I know how officers can be, and believe me you
have one of the best.” (PSI, p.44.) She asked that the sheriff let Mr. Thomas know that she
appreciated all that he had done for her family “to help us all through this tough time.” (PSI,
p.44.)
Later in his law enforcement career, Mr. Thomas spearheaded the creation of the Nez
Perce County K-9 unit. (PSI, pp.50-51.) His father and his uncle were also K-9 handlers, and
Mr. Thomas was ultimately paired with a bloodhound, who could be used for, among other
things, “tracking suspects, finding lost children and locating disoriented adults . . . .” (PSI, p.52.)
Mr. Thomas “pitched in from his own pocket” to start the K-9 program, and the dog lived with
Mr. Thomas. (PSI, pp.54-55.) Mr. Thomas and the dog proved to be a success at tracking
suspects and, as another letter of appreciation pointed out, were “a tremendous asset not only to
the valley, but to other communities and jurisdictions as well. Whenever and wherever they are
needed, Cpl. Thomas and Queene work tirelessly together to find our lost loved ones, friends and
neighbors.” (PSI, pp.56-58.)
Unfortunately, Mr. Thomas lost his job in law enforcement due to what appeared to be a
rather innocuous episode in which a dog that belonged to a woman he had just arrested, escaped
temporarily. (PSI, pp.130-31.) The dog was found a few days later, but when Mr. Thomas
learned that the woman’s daughter wanted to sue over the loss of the dog, he apparently swore in
the prosecutor’s office and was placed on administrative leave. (PSI, p.131.) As his counsel
pointed out, however, Mr. Thomas was not defeated by this setback, nor was he bitter towards
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the larger law enforcement community. He promptly went back to work selling cars, so he could
take care of his family, and he then started his own company to provide quality tactical gear and
clothing for law enforcement. (Tr., p.1485, L.13 – p.1486, L.15; see also PSI, p.129.)
At sentencing, however, the district court merely noted Mr. Thomas’ law enforcement
background; it did not acknowledge the exceptional nature of his career, or the numerous
accolades he had received. The court simply stated that Mr. Thomas had an “appropriate work
history, including law enforcement, which [he] did for numerous years successfully.”
(Tr., p.1507, Ls.13-15.)
Third, the remarkable support of Mr. Thomas’ friends, acquaintances, and family, as well
as his good character in general, also supported a lesser sentence in this case. See State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, among other things,
had the support of his family and his employer); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App.
1991) (reducing the defendant’s aggregate sentence based, in part, on the “other positive
attributes of his character”). Prior to the original sentencing in this case, Mr. Thomas’ friends
and family wrote myriad letters of support for him. (PSI, pp.62-107.) Then, the district court
received numerous additional letters of support and requests for leniency prior to the sentencing
hearing after the second trial. (R., pp.3208-48.) There are far too many letters and emails to
address each one individually, but they merit a thorough review as nearly all of them highlight
Mr. Thomas’ dedication to his sons, to his other family members, his distinguished public
service, and his focus on helping others. They clearly show that Mr. Thomas has a strong,
lifelong character of empathy and thoughtfulness. Many of the letters even provided specific
examples of the ways in which Mr. Thomas had helped the people in his life over the years.
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For example, Mr. Thomas’ cousin wrote, “When I think of Joe, I think of a humanitarian.
Since childhood, he has always been the type of person who would help anyone out. He always
had a great moral compass; he always seemed to do the right thing because it was the right thing
to do.” (PSI, p.72.) She went on to provide a specific example: “During the summer of 2010 I
had severely broken my leg in an accident. With three girls and a household to run, I was very
overwhelmed and was unable to do the simplest of chores. Joe was living in town . . . and heard
about my situation. Joe was at my doorstep with his two little boys in an instant to help. His
help was incredible: making dinner, doing dishes, and sweeping the floor.” (PSI, p.72.) She also
explained how she was “touched by what a loving father he had become.” (PSI, p.72.) She
discussed how, before writing her letter to the court, she had “asked some of Joe’s closest friends
if they had ever on any occasion (thinking all the way back to elementary school) . . . seen Joe in
a physical altercation of any kind, or if they had seen him lose his temper. The consensus was
unanimous. Not one of us, who had known him his whole life, had ever witnessed violence of
any kind: not to women, children or animals.” (PSI, p.72.) She wrote that Mr. Thomas was “a
caring, calm, selfless, person” who was “an amazing father.” (PSI, p.72.) And she concluded by
stating that, “[t]he world will be a far better place with Joe in our community.” (PSI, p.72.)
Another cousin, who was employed as a school psychologist, wrote that she had also
known Mr. Thomas since he was born, as he had been a “childhood playmate, a friend, a cousin,
an advocate, and a support person.” (PSI, p.73.) She went on to say that she had “personally
witnessed him be a loving father, husband, brother, son, nephew, and friend.” (PSI, p.73.) She
stated that she knew Mr. Thomas to have a “calm, level headed temperament,” and that he
always wanted to be a “humanitarian and help people ever since he was a young child.” (PSI,
p.73.)
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She also offered specific examples; she wrote, “During a more recent difficult transition
in my life, Joey was the first to offer assistance and follow through with helping me when I
needed it.” (PSI, p.73.) She went on to describe how Mr. Thomas helped her move when she
was “under tremendous pressure” as a single mother. (PSI, p.73.) She stated, “Even though Joe
lived almost 90 miles away in Grand Coulee, he showed up on time in Spokane as he promised
he would with an empty trailer to move my belongings. He even refused to take gas money from
me even though I knew it was a difficult financial time for him as well.” (PSI, p.73.) She
described how Mr. Thomas was a “most diligent and patient father,” who persevered “in taking
care of all the challenging needs of young children.”

(PSI, p.73.)

She also wrote that

Mr. Thomas had “dedicated his life to his children and helping others,” and she strongly urged
the court to “consider the character of Joe as witnessed by those who have known him his entire
life.” (PSI, p.74.) In closing, she wrote, “I cannot say enough about the dedication, integrity,
and patience that I have witnessed in my cousin, Joe.” (PSI, p.74.)
Letters requesting leniency and revealing more positive details about Mr. Thomas’
character also came simply from acquaintances and members of the community. For example, a
woman who had owned a gift shop in the town where Mr. Thomas grew up wrote to say that she
had known Mr. Thomas for most of his life and recognized that he had “always made himself a
part of his community” and had a “very good name” in the community. (PSI, p.79.) She
explained, “Somehow he just seems to know when he is needed and never has to be asked. He is
just always there.” (PSI, p.79.) She also stated, “When you work with the public like I do you
get to know people very well. Joe is one person I would trust with my business and with my life.
If only we had more people like him in our community and our world. Please give him a break
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on this sentence and let him once again become a productive member of our community.” (PSI,
p.79.)
Another friend wrote a letter that discussed a conversation she had with Mr. Thomas
about why he wanted to be a police officer instead of a state trooper, which she felt would be
safer. (PSI, p.85.) She explained that Mr. Thomas told her he wanted to “be able to protect
people, save helpless children, [and] put bad people away.” (PSI, p.85.) And another friend,
who attended school with Mr. Thomas, wrote a letter in which he stated, “As one of the leaders
of his athletic teams and his class, other athletes and students turned to Joe for advice and
guidance. Only vocal when had to be, Joe led by example; and people took notice! He had an
amazing work ethic and earned everything he received.” (PSI. p.87.)
Mr. Thomas’ compassion has been a lifelong aspect of his character. Many people
described how they had been affected by Mr. Thomas’s acts of kindness over the years. One
woman wrote that she attended school with Mr. Thomas, and she had recently reached out for
help on social media because she had an elderly friend who was in need of “adaptive equipment”
that would allow her to stay in her home. (PSI, p.90.) She stated, “Joe was the first one to step
up and try to assist in this situation. We had not spoken in quite a while but he still was the first
to put himself out there to help someone else who he did not know.” (PSI, p.90.) Similarly, a
woman he dated in junior high and high school wrote to say that, despite the fact they broke up,
Mr. Thomas remained one of her best friends. (PSI, p.91.) She said, “Joe always looked out for
me and my best interest” and that she had recently had a phone conversation with him during
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which he gave her “so much hope, encouragement, kindness and love just in a phone call.” (PSI,
p.91.)18
Another person who attended school with Mr. Thomas, though he had to finish high
school in a different city, wrote that he had expressed an interest in graduating with his original
classmates, and Mr. Thomas, “started a petition that would allow me to walk with my class and
had nearly every person in my class sign it.” (PSI, p.94.) He went on to state, “I cannot tell you
enough how much that meant to me. He made the difference in my world at that time. Joe was a
true friend for me when I needed one and I will never forget what he did for me.” (PSI, p.94.)
Another letter demonstrated Mr. Thomas’ extraordinary commitment to the people in his
life who needed help. This man commented that their friendship began when Mr. Thomas
helped him find the right vehicle, and they became fast friends. (PSI, p.98.) But he explained
that, when he later went through a divorce, Mr. Thomas offered to let him live with him “without
any payment or fees.” (PSI, p.98.) He wrote, “Joe jumped to help and immediately covered me
with all bills and lodging. I was often left with only $40 dollars a month to survive and despite
this, Joe provided everything for me. I lived off of him and I had no way to pay. He didn’t care
about the money, but instead helped me to stay with my children.” (PSI, p.98.) He went on to
say that Mr. Thomas’ support was “more than just Joe throwing money my way. He truly cared
and made sure that me and my two kids were comfortable. He offered support at all levels.”
(PSI, p.98.) He said that he never saw anger in Mr. Thomas, and he never exchanged any
“course words” with him. (PSI, p.99.) Ultimately, he said that—in light of the compassion

18

It appears this same woman wrote two additional letters of support. (See R., pp.3232, 3246.)
Her last name is different than it was in the letter she wrote in 2012, but she stated she had been
through a divorce. (R., p.3232.) In another one of her later letters, she stated, “Never did Joe
show a cruel or mean ounce of hatred, disrespect toward me or anyone he came into contact with
EVER!” (R., p.3246.)
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Mr. Thomas showed towards him—he struggled to come to terms with the verdict, and he asked
the court to show mercy at sentencing. (PSI, p.99.)
Mr. Thomas’ sister, brother-in-law, mother, and step-father also all wrote detailed and
profound letters of support both prior to the original sentencing hearing, and prior to the 2017
sentencing hearing. (PSI, pp.102-04, 123-25; R., pp.3217-18, 3222, 3230-31, 3242.) In her first
letter, his sister stated, “Joe is and always has been the best brother I could ever hope for.” (PSI,
p.102.) And much like the rest of his family, she went on to write, “Everything about Joe’s
character directly contradicts the situation he is in. It does not make any sense at all.” (PSI,
p.102.) She said she knew “without a doubt” that if Mr. Thomas was allowed to “be home with
his children he will not be a threat to anyone and will be a contributing member to society.”
(PSI, p.102.) She noted that, even when he was incarcerated, Mr. Thomas had “chosen to focus
his time on trying to help others. He has tried to help find ways to build a financial future for his
children. He has thought of fundraisers to do to raise money for First Responders and Law
Enforcement agencies. Joe asked me to research his blood type to see if he might be a candidate
to donate his kidney to a person in need of a transplant.” (PSI, p.102.) She wrote, “This is my
brother. He wants to help people.” (PSI, p.102.) And in closing she stated, “I pray that you too
can see that this tragedy does not define Joseph A. Thomas and that if given the opportunity Joe
would be an asset to many, especially his young children.” (PSI, p.102.)
In her letter written prior to the second sentencing hearing, Mr. Thomas’ sister
expounded on his service to others.

(R., pp.3230-31.)

She wrote about how, as a child,

Mr. Thomas enjoyed helping friends, neighbors, and grandparents. (R., p.3230.) She stated that
his “calling to serve others just grew stronger as the years progressed.

It was common

knowledge that if you ever needed anything Joe was the guy to call. He would put other’s needs
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in front of his own on a regular basis. He was so full of pride and a sense of duty to serve others
when he became a police officer.” (R., p.3230.) She went on to recount many more stories
about Mr. Thomas’s generosity with his time and his possessions. (R., pp.3230-31.) And she
stated, “We all still grieve for the life that Joe should be living with his little boys and all of us.
We also grieve for the life that Beth should be living as well. I would never minimize or
disrespect the loss of Beth. . .There is no victory or winner in this tragedy.” (R., p.3231.) She
closed by stating, “I wish for healing and peace for everyone involved. My hope is that my
brother will be shown leniency to be afforded an opportunity to give to others and be the person
we have known him to be. Human, hurting, imperfect but willing and able to be a productive
member of society.” (R., p.3231.)
One of his former teachers, who was also the mother of one his best friends, also wrote a
letter in support of Mr. Thomas. (R., p.3225.) She said she had known Mr. Thomas during
different phases of his life, and she wanted the district court to know “what has always been
consistent in each of those phases of his life: respect, caring and kindness.” (R., p.3225.) She
wrote that Mr. Thomas encouraged her son to pursue athletics, and he ultimately went on to play
football for the University of Oregon; she felt that “Joe played a major role in helping him get
there.” (R., p.3225.) She also revealed that she lost her son suddenly in 2008, and Mr. Thomas
came “as soon as his work allowed” to offer “support and comfort” to her and her younger son
who has Down Syndrome, and who thought of Mr. Thomas as another brother. (R., p.3225.)
Mr. Thomas’ niece wrote that he had “always been one of the most supportive people” in
her life and that he gave her advice “ranging from ways to help promote community kindness to
how to relax and be confident before an important race or game.” (R., p.3236.) She explained
that Mr. Thomas had remained positive in his letters to her and did not let his incarceration affect
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their relationship. (R., p.3236.) She also wrote that she hoped someday she would be able to
give Mr. Thomas a hug, and “show him how his advice has not only impacted me but also my
community through acts of kindness and service projects, and make him proud, competing in our
favorite sport, track and field.” (R., p.3236.)
Finally, Mr. Thomas’ positive impact on others continued even after his initial
imprisonment. Such conduct should also be considered as mitigating information. See, e.g.,
State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984).

For example, one writer said that

Mr. Thomas had read the bible to someone who could not read, and had written three books for
the purpose of helping new inmates. (R., p.3221.) Mr. Thomas’s counsel also encouraged the
district court to consider that he had continued to help others even after he was incarcerated. She
said, “Joe found a way to try to do something work-wise that would help other people. Over the
last few years he’s worked to help produce books that have different information for people . . .
who are incarcerated, for their family members to understand the system, and help prepare a case
and keep track of documents.” (Tr., p.1486, Ls.16-25.) She explained, “Even incarcerated this
is a man who was resilient enough to find a way to give back and to do something career-wise to
have positive moments in his life.” (Tr., p.1487, Ls.2-5.)
Some of the other letters before the district court also showed that Mr. Thomas had
continued to reach out to others and build positive relationships despite his incarceration. One of
those writers was actually based in France, but she apparently learned a great deal about
Mr. Thomas through their communications. She wrote, “[d]espite being imprisoned for six
years, Joe still cares for others before caring for himself, thus proving his will to live for the good
of everyone. This force of character almost certainly comes from his children. He has two
beautiful boys who mean everything to him . . . .” (R., p.3223.) She went on to say that she had
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“faith in true justice” and prayed “that the sentencing of Mr. Thomas may be fair and
compassionate towards a man whose only purpose in life is to improve the daily lives of his
relatives and those in need.” (R., p.3224.) Similarly, another woman who worked as a paralegal
in California shared that she had learned about Mr. Thomas’ case and his background through
multiple communications. (R, pp.3208-10.) She pointed out that Mr. Thomas had been a
“model prisoner” in the six years he had been incarcerated. (R., p.3209.) She asked the district
court to weigh the benefits of sentencing Mr. Thomas to a sentence of twenty-five years to life—
or, as she put it, “a slow death sentence”—against the “costs, and the long-term, collective
emotional and psychological impact” such a sentence would have on Mr. Thomas’ children and
his family. (R., p.3210.)
Nevertheless, despite the abundance of mitigating information in this case, the district
court imposed a fixed sentence of 24 years. (R., p.3273-75.) This sentence was not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing. Mr. Thomas’ background, his lack of a prior record, and the
overwhelming outpouring of support and commentary regarding his exemplary character—from
people who knew him his entire life—supported a lesser sentence. They also contradict the
district court’s assumption that Mr. Thomas would pose “a significant risk for violence with
women” in the future. (Tr., p.1512, Ls.3-5.) The record, including the statements provided by
his ex-wives, contains no evidence of any previous physical violence towards anyone throughout
his entire life. Mr. Thomas’ first wife said he was never physical with her. (PSI, p.126.)
Similarly, his third wife said he never hurt her. (PSI, p.128.) In fact, the numerous comments in
the letters of support about Mr. Thomas’ kindness, calm demeanor, lack of a temper, and gentle
nature with his children as well as other people, suggest entirely the opposite of the district
court’s conclusion. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.72, 73, 82, 96, 99, 104; R; pp.3219, 3248, 3239.) Thus,
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the district court did not reach its decision that Mr. Thomas posed a risk to women in the future,
indeed a “significant risk,” through an exercise of reason.
A shorter fixed term would also serve as a significant deterrent and provide appropriate
retribution. Indeed, as Mr. Thomas’ counsel noted, much of Mr. Thomas’ time in prison is spent
in solitary confinement because of his law enforcement background. (Tr., p.1491, L.18 – p.1492,
L.14.) And in light of the fact that he had never been to prison prior to this offense, any
deterrence that was necessary—or even relevant given that Mr. Thomas had no prior record of
any similar acts—has almost certainly already been achieved as he has already been incarcerated
for over seven years. However, the district court stated that it believed imposing anything other
than a “significant sentence . . . would pose no specific deterrence to you or any general
deterrence to the public . . . .” (Tr., p.1512, Ls.13-16 (emphasis added).) This is illogical for
several reasons. First, an indeterminate life sentence, with a minimum of 10 years fixed, is most
certainly a significant sentence that would serve to deter people; the legislature clearly believed it
would. I.C. § 18-4004 (Legislature recognized that some first degree murder cases may call for a
fixed term of 10 years). And second, it seems to indicate that the district court believed that only
long sentences can deter people from committing crimes. This would call into question the
deterrent value of any fixed sentence under 24 years and is contrary to common sense. Indeed,
for most people, the prospect of spending any time in prison is clearly an effective deterrent.
Finally, given his lack of a prior record and the anomalous nature of this offense, there is
no indication that Mr. Thomas needs significant rehabilitation, let alone 24 years of it. The
district court stated that Mr. Thomas was “well on [his] way” to being rehabilitated because he
was assisting others, and putting his needs secondary to those of others. (Tr., p.1512, Ls.18-23.)
But this ignored the fact that the majority of the letters of support submitted on behalf of
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Mr. Thomas made it very clear that he had always been a person whose main focus in life was
helping others. Indeed, most of the stories people recounted showed that Mr. Thomas had
always been extraordinarily helpful. This is what truly stood out to so many people.
As such, the district court’s sentence was unreasonable under any view of the facts. It
failed to reach its sentencing decision through an exercise of reason as it failed to properly
consider Mr. Thomas’ background and true nature. This is a man who clearly loves his children,
his friends, and his fellow man. He earned the respect of his colleagues and the public through
his exceptional service in law enforcement, and he was admired and appreciated by his family,
his friends, and his community. Surely, this is the kind of person who deserves leniency.
Indeed, if Mr. Thomas is not deserving of leniency, it begs the question of who would be—who
exactly the legislature had in mind when it set the minimum fixed time a person might serve for
this offense.
One of Mr. Thomas’ cousins may have described him most accurately and poignantly.
She wrote,
So when I think of Joe, I think of the man who offers his arm to a frail aunt, a man
who cheerfully carries in groceries for his ailing mother to save her ailing back, a
man who swims with all the nieces and nephews for the joy of children and to
give their mothers a break; I think of the conscientious father that changed all the
diapers, washed his boys’ hands before they ate a snack and never raised his voice
in situations that would have most fathers handing kids to mothers and heading
back to the football game on TV. . . Joe has always been a vital and active part of
our family, his children’s life, and his community. We are the worse for having
him locked away.
(PSI, p.88.) There is no question this offense was a terrible tragedy, but it does not and should
not define Joe Thomas’ character. Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this Court reduce the
fixed portion of his sentence as it deems appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand his
case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this
Court reduce the fixed potion of his sentence as it deems appropriate.
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